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Mr. Gorsuch, Meet Mr. Marshall: A Private-Law Framework for the Public-Law Puzzle of 
Subdelegation 
 
Gary Lawson* 
(forthcoming, American Enterprise Institute) 
Abstract 
In the wake of Gundy v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2116 (2019), there is reason to think that 
five Justices might be willing to consider reviving the constitutional non-subdelegation doctrine.  
But in what form?  Judges and scholars have labored for more than two centuries to come up with 
a legally rigorous standard for evaluating the permissible scope and breadth of congressional 
grants of discretion to executive and judicial agents.  Some, such as Justice Scalia, eventually gave 
up in despair.  That is a grave mistake.  Lawyers had faced subdelegation questions for centuries 
before the Constitution was ratified, in the context of private-law agency arrangements.  There are 
good reasons to think that the Constitution draws on private-law background norms for much of 
its meaning, and the subdelegation problem is an excellent candidate for elaboration in private-
law terms.  Thus, when Chief Justice John Marshall in 1825 drew a distinction between 
impermissible grants of discretion on “important subjects” and permissible grants of discretion 
on matters of “less interest,” his approach was far more structured, grounded in precedent , and 
law-like than may appear at first glance.  It drew on principles and case law developed in settings 
ranging from powers of appointment in wills, in which the holder of the power tries to designate 
another person to exercise it,  to the lack of privity between merchants and subdelegees in the 
absence of express authority on the part of the agents to subdelegate power, to the lack of authority 
of factors and supercargoes to entrust sale of goods to subagents without the express consent of 
their principals.  Thus, judges worried about the open-ended character of a non-subdelegation 
doctrine need not run away from Chief Justice Marshall’s classic formulation.  They simply need 
to flesh out its private-law background.  There was abundant law regarding subdelegation in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the Constitution’s subdelegation principle is grounded 
in that law. 
 
In 1825, Chief Justice John Marshall confidently proclaimed that “[i]t will not be contended 
that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunal, powers which are strictly and 
exclusively legislative.”1  He explained that “[t]he difference between the departments 
                                                            
*  Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law.  I am profoundly grateful to Peter Wallison for making 
so many insightful suggestions and comments that he should probably be listed as a co-author.  I thank Robert G. 
Natelson for making it all possible and Guy Seidman for helping make the possible a reality.  And I am grateful to 
Philip S. Beck and Boston University School of Law for unfailing support of scholarship. 
 
1   Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825).  In contemplating what will and will not be contended, 
Chief Justice Marshall evidently anticipated neither the modern legal academy, see Julian Davis Mortenson & 
Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, -- COLUM. L. REV. – (----); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring 
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undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the 
law.”2  One might term this the “civics book” model of government: each federal institution has 
its constitutionally assigned role; and the assigned role of the legislature is to make the law, which 
the other departments will then execute and/or interpret. 
The problem with the civics book model, even on its own terms, is that it assumes that one 
can readily distinguish the making of a law from its execution or interpretation.  Sometimes that 
distinction seems straightforward.  If Congress enacted into the United States Code a literal 
inkblot,3 surely it would functionally, and constitutionally, be an act of lawmaking rather than 
execution or interpretation for the executive or judiciary to purport to apply that content-less “law.”  
(For someone who doubts the existence of any kind of constitutional subdelegation4 rule, this 
example is a good test case.)  But at other times the lines among those government functions and 
departments become downright Robin-Thicke-like blurry.  If the executive “executes” and the 
                                                            
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002), nor modern Supreme Court Justices.  See Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
In defense of Chief Justice Marshall: How could anyone in 1825 – outside of an asylum -- anticipate the modern legal 
academy or modern Supreme Court Justices? 
 
2   23 U.S. (10 Wheat) at 42. 
 
3   Cf. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 166 (1990) (calling the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause an “indecipherable inkblot”). 
 
4   It is conventional in constitutional discourse to refer to “nondelegation” or the “nondelegation doctrine” when 
discussing the ability of Congress to vest discretion in executive or judicial officials.  For reasons explained here and 
elsewhere, see infra --, the proper terms are “subdelegation” and the “non-subdelegation doctrine.” Power is initially 
delegated by the people, through the vehicle of the Constitution, to Congress, and the question is whether Congress, 
pursuant to the instrument of delegation, can then subdelegate all or part of its delegated authority to some other actor.  
See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 377 (2014).  Accordingly, while the term “non-
subdelegation doctrine” is concededly a bit awkward, this is an instance in which intellectual precision is more 
important than elegance, and I will accordingly use the terms “subdelegation” and “non-subdelegation doctrine” rather 
than their more familiar but less accurate substitutes. 
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judiciary “construes” the Clean Air Act5 or Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,6 are they 
in truth performing a legislative function?  Do those statutes, and countless others like them, 
subdelegate to other actors “powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative” and hence are 
not subdelegable? 
Chief Justice Marshall two centuries ago was acutely aware of this potential line-drawing 
problem.  Right after laying out the civics-book model, he added, “but the maker of the law may 
commit something to the discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of this 
power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry.”7  That sounds ominous to persons who worry 
about constraints on judges.8  How would one conduct such a “delicate and difficult inquiry” in 
order to determine when and whether congressional grants of discretion to other actors cross a 
constitutional line?  How could that possibly serve as a judicially administrable test for 
ascertaining the limits of congressional grants of discretion? 
                                                            
5   See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2018) (defining primary air quality standards, to be set by the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, as “ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the 
judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to 
protect the public health”). 
 
6   See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018) (declaring it unlawful “to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors”). 
 
7   Wayman, 23 U.S (10 Wheat.) at 42-43.  Accord: The Federalist No. 37 (1788) (James Madison) (“Experience has 
instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient 
certainty, its three great provinces – the legislative, executive, and judiciary . . . .  Questions daily occur in the course 
of practice which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political 
science.”). 
 
8   For myself, I worry much less about constraints on judges than I do about getting constitutional meaning right, 
especially when one is talking about something as basic to the Constitution as its allocation of powers among different 
institutions.  But that is a topic for another day.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 (2014).  The point of this contribution is to show that, whatever may be 
true in other contexts, the constitutional rule against subdelegation is both interpretatively correct and consistent with 
judicial modesty, to the extent that one considers judicial modesty an important value. 
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Chief Justice Marshall had an answer: “The line has not been exactly drawn which separates 
those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of 
less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act 
under such general provisions to fill up the details . . . .”9 
That’s it?  That’s all that America’s most famous Chief Justice could come up with?  It’s okay 
for executives and courts to handle matters of “less interest,” but Congress has to decide on the 
“important subjects”? 
Yes, actually, that’s it.  That is the best that John Marshall could do in 1825. It is also the best 
that I could do in 1994 when I first tried to formulate an originalist account of the Constitution’s 
non-subdelegation principle and came up with: “Congress must make whatever policy decisions 
are sufficiently important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them.”10  
Eight years later, I still could do no better: 
Chief Justice Marshall’s circular formulation was right all along, and rather than wind 
our way back to it indirectly, we might as well take the freeway. The line between 
legislative and executive power (or between legislative and judicial power) must be 
drawn in the context of each particular statutory scheme. In every case, Congress must 
make the central, fundamental decisions, but Congress can leave ancillary matters to the 
President or the courts. One can try to find alternative ways to express the distinction 
between fundamental and ancillary matters, such as focusing on case-resolving power or 
demonstration of political commitment or choices among salient alternatives, but in the 
end, one cannot really get behind or beneath the fact that law execution and application 
                                                            
9   Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43 (emphasis added). 
 
10   Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1994). 
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involve discretion in matters of “less interest” but turn into legislation when that 
discretion extends to “important subjects.” That is the line that the Constitution draws, 
and there is no escape from it.11 
The seeming vagueness of these Marshallian/Lawsonian formulations is surely what gives pause 
to some judges, including most notably the irreplaceable Justice Scalia,12 about whether a 
constitutional non-subdelegation doctrine is judicially manageable.  
There is some reason to think that Justice Neil Gorsuch shares these concerns — not enough 
to abandon the non-subdelegation principle altogether but enough to lead him to search for an 
alternative account of the principle.  In Gundy v. United States,13 Justice Gorsuch called for 
resurrection of the non-subdelegation doctrine after more than eighty years of dormancy.14  He 
managed to get not only Justice Thomas but also Chief Justice Roberts to join his opinion, and 
Justice Alito indicated that he would be willing to reconsider the Court’s subdelegation 
jurisprudence if four other votes can be found.15  Shortly thereafter, Justice Kavanagh, who did 
                                                            
11   Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 376-77 (2002). 
 
12   Although Professor Antonin Scalia was quite keen on resurrecting the non-subdelegation doctrine, see Antonin 
Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, REGULATION, July/Aug. 1980, at 25, 28 (“even with all its Frankenstein-like 
warts, knobs, and (concededly) dangers, the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is worth hewing from the ice.”), 
Justice Antonin Scalia became perhaps the Court’s most forceful opponent of policing the breadth of Congress’s grants 
of discretion to executive or judicial agents.  See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  His reasons for declaring the non-
subdelegation doctrine effectively unenforceable were grounded in judicial restraint rather than constitutional 
meaning: “Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even 
some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and the judges applying 
it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a question of 
degree.”  Id.  For Justice Scalia, anything that was a matter of degree rather than principle was prima facie 
nonjusticiable.  See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4 (critically examining Justice Scalia’s commitment to rules in 
constitutional adjudication). 
 
13   139 S.Ct. 2116 (2019). 
 
14   See id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 
15   See id. at 2130) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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not participate in Gundy, wrote in a concurrence to a denial of certiorari that “JUSTICE GORSUCH’s 
thoughtful Gundy opinion raised important points that may warrant further consideration in future 
cases.”16  That sounds a lot like five Justices at least willing to think carefully about reviving some 
kind of non-subdelegation doctrine.  The question is: What kind of doctrine are they prepared to 
revive?  Would five Justices today be willing to agree with Chief Justice Marshall that courts need 
to distinguish “important subjects” from “matters of less interest”? 
It is evident that Justice Gorsuch had these concerns much on his mind in Gundy.  It is a mortal 
certainty that Justice Gorsuch is well aware both of Chief Justice Marshall’s account of 
subdelegation and of my belief that Chief Justice Marshall was essentially right as a matter of 
original meaning; Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Gundy cites – on more than one occasion 
-- both Wayman v. Southard17and me.18  But those multiple citations conspicuously avoid 
emphasizing the test for subdelegations that Chief Justice Marshall and I endorsed.19  Justice 
Gorsuch had something else to offer in response to his own question: “What's the test?”20 
After noting Marshall’s and Madison’s observations about the difficulty of the inquiry, Justice 
Gorsuch found three principles that he believes can and should guide an inquiry into the boundaries 
of the legislative power to vest discretion in executive or judicial actors: 
                                                            
16   Paul v. United States, 589 U.S. – (2019 (statement of Justice Kavanagh respecting the denial of certiorari). 
 
17   See 139 S.Ct. at 2133, 2135, 2137 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting). 
 
18   See id. at 2135, 2140 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 
19   Chief Justice Marshall’s formulation gets cited at one point, see id. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), but, as we 
will shortly see, the test gets reframed by Justice Gorsuch to mean something very different from what it actually says.  
See infra --.  My proposed formulation, understandably enough, ends up somewhere at the bottom of the Marianas 
Trench. 
 
20   Id. at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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First, we know that as long as Congress makes the policy decisions when regulating 
private conduct, it may authorize another branch to “fill up the details” . . . . 
. . . 
Second, once Congress prescribes the rule governing private conduct, it may make 
the application of that rule depend on executive fact-finding . . . . 
Third, Congress may assign the executive and judicial branches certain non-
legislative responsibilities . . . . So, for example, when a congressional statute confers 
wide discretion to the executive, no separation-of-powers problem may arise if “the 
discretion is to be exercised over matters already within the scope of executive power.”21 
Talking about “important subjects” and matters of “less interest” was pretty clearly off the table 
for Justice Gorsuch. 
It shouldn’t be -- not for Justice Gorsuch nor for any other Justice who knows that the 
Constitution forbids subdelegation of legislative authority but who worries about giving judges 
seemingly open-ended power.  There is far more to Chief Justice Marshall’s test than meets the 
eye. 
Lawyers had faced subdelegation questions for centuries before the Constitution was ratified, 
in the context of private-law agency arrangements.  There are good reasons to think that the 
Constitution draws on private-law background norms for much of its meaning, and the 
subdelegation problem is an excellent candidate for elaboration in private-law terms.  Once one 
fully understands that Chief Justice Marshall was drawing on those private-law norms in 1825, his 
approach reveals itself as far more structured, grounded in precedent , and law-like than may 
appear at first glance from a simple reference to “important subjects” and matters of “less interest.”  
                                                            
21   Id. at 2135-37 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
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Thus, Justice Gorsuch does not need to run away from Chief Justice Marshall’s inquiry; he simply 
needs to flesh out its private-law background, which does not leave judges free to roam through 
their personal preferences.  There was law regarding subdelegation in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and there is every reason to think that the Constitution’s subdelegation 
principle is grounded in that law.  A test for subdelegation based on eighteenth-century agency 
law is not only correct as a matter of original meaning; it is judicially manageable.  Indeed, it is at 
least as judicially manageable as Justice Gorsuch’s alternative three-principle structure for 
assessing subdelegations. 
The bottom line is that a distinction between “important subjects” and matters of “less 
interest” --properly understood, as Chief Justice Marshall surely understood it, as a shorthand 
reference to principles of founding-era agency law -- is both theoretically and practically sound as 
a test for identifying unconstitutional legislative subdelegations. 
Part I fleshes out the real meaning of Chief Justice Marshall’s cryptic-at-first-glance 
comments in Wayman, suggesting how the Constitution’s original meaning, which was aptly if 
tersely reflected in Wayman, lends itself to a legally rigorous  reconstruction of the subdelegation 
doctrine.  Part II compares that original meaning to Justice Gorsuch’s alternative formulation, 
suggesting some similarities and a few important differences.  Part III briefly explains that the 
subdelegation doctrine cannot be treated wholly apart from the general size and scope of the federal 
government; Justice Gorsuch’s claim that the subdelegation doctrine is independent of those 
matters22 is simply not correct.  Part IV ruminates about one possible way to frame the 
                                                            
22   See id. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Nor would enforcing the Constitution's demands spell doom for what 
some call the ‘administrative state.’ The separation of powers does not prohibit any particular policy outcome, let 
alone dictate any conclusion about the proper size and scope of government . . . . Congress is hardly bereft of options 
to accomplish all it might wish to achieve. It may always authorize executive branch officials to fill in even a large 
number of details, to find facts that trigger the generally applicable rule of conduct specified in a statute, or to exercise 
non-legislative powers.”). 
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subdelegation problem in a fashion that will not spook Justices who have absorbed the mindset 
that the normative principle of “judicial restraint” trumps constitutional meaning in a large set of 
real-world cases. 
In sum, the Supreme Court does not need to create a non-subdelegation doctrine.  It needs 
only to rediscover it. 
 
I 
 
As a matter of original meaning,23 in order to figure out the constitutional test for when 
congressional grants of discretion to other actors amount to forbidden subdelegations of legislative 
power, one needs to know from where the Constitution’s subdelegation principle comes.  The 
source of the principle will have much to say about its content. 
First, one could try to derive the subdelegation principle from the “civics book” model of 
enumerated institutional powers: The President and the federal courts cannot exercise legislative 
powers because they are not granted any such powers (beyond the President’s presentment powers 
and whatever common-law-fashioning powers the courts possess by virtue of the “judicial 
Power”).  Nor, the argument continues, does Congress have an enumerated power to subdelegate 
its legislative powers to other actors.  Hence, the Constitution’s basic scheme of enumerated 
powers implies a principle of non-subdelegation.  That is essentially the core of Justice Gorsuch’s 
                                                            
23   There are, of course, a great many versions of “original meaning.”  The version employed here locates meaning in 
the hypothetical intentions of the hypothetical author of the Constitution (“We the People”), which operationally is 
equivalent to the understandings that would have been held by a reasonable intended reader of the document in (for 
purposes of the non-subdelegation doctrine) 1788.  Fleshing out the characteristics of the intended reasonable reader 
is a task for another life.  See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right this 
Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457 (2016).  Fortunately, I doubt whether the differences among versions of original meaning 
matter much for purposes of the nondelegation doctrine; I suspect that all of those versions will converge to a common 
core of meaning in this context. 
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argument in Gundy for a non-subdelegation principle,24 and some very talented scholars have at 
times made arguments along these lines.25 The possible counter to this argument, however, might 
claim that (1) Congress does indeed have power to give other actors as much discretion as Congress 
wants to give them by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause26 and (2) once Congress enacts 
such a statute granting extensive or even limitless discretion to the President or the courts, the other 
actors are formally exercising “executive” or “judicial” power in carrying into effect the 
congressional instruction to, in essence, make the law.27  Thus, for the “civics book” argument to 
succeed, it must be the case that there is some substantive principle lurking in the Constitution that 
would make it not “proper” for Congress to grant too much discretion to other actors (and/or not 
part of the executive and judicial powers for those actors to exercise that discretion).  The “civics 
book” argument is thus a fine logical structure, but it is incomplete without something to fill in 
that missing substantive principle. 
A second argument against subdelegation of legislative authority would look to the 
Constitution’s elaborate mechanisms for electoral accountability.  Much of the Constitution is 
devoted to the procedures for selecting members of Congress and for determining the electorate 
that will perform the selecting.  Surely, one might reason, the Constitution would not care so much 
how members of Congress get selected if they aren’t actually supposed to make the key decisions. 
                                                            
24   139 S.Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 
25   See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 11; Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005). 
 
26   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”). 
 
27 For the classic statement of this position, see Posner & Vermeule, supra, note 1. 
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Marty Redish’s “political commitment” principle reflects a variant of this argument,28 as does 
David Schoenbrod’s accountability-based “consent of the governed” approach.29  The counter to 
this argument is that members of Congress are elected in order to exercise their constitutional 
powers.  If one of those constitutional powers is the power to grant unlimited discretion to other 
actors, then that is simply part of the package of powers which they were elected to exercise.  
Again, the real issue is whether there is some underlying substantive limitation on Congress’s 
ability to punt away too much of its decision-making responsibility. 
The third argument, and the one to which the others eventually must reduce, directly locates 
a non-subdelegation principle in the very fiber of the Constitution.  It took me twenty years plus 
the indispensable Rob Natelson to grasp this point, but the real ground for the Constitution’s non-
subdelegation principle is the nature of the Constitution as a particular kind of legal instrument.  
Chief Justice Marshall grasped this point in 1825, even though he did not expressly articulate it, 
and his grasp generated the test that he so tersely announced.  We must today understand what 
Chief Justice Marshall took for granted in 1825. 
The argument starts with something very basic: No text can expressly contain all of the rules 
for its own interpretation.  Even if it purported to do so, one would need external rules of 
interpretation to tell how to interpret the text’s internally expressed rules of interpretation – even 
if only to tell one to treat those internally expressed rules seriously rather than metaphorically, 
frivolously, or sarcastically.  There are always background norms of interpretation at work in any 
act of communication, whether it is a dramatic poetry reading, a conversation between spouses, or 
                                                            
28   See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 136-37 (1995). 
 
29   See David Schoenbrod, Consent of the Governed: A Constitutional Norm that the Courts Should Substantially 
Enforce, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213 (2020). 
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a lawyerly study of the United States Constitution.  Those background norms will differ depending 
on what kind of document one is interpreting; the background rules for interpreting poems are not 
going to be identical to the background rules for interpreting health care proxy designations or 
end-of-life instructions.30 
The Constitution is not a poem.  Nor is it a chain novel, a diary, or a script for a Monty Python 
sketch.  It is a legal document of some sort, written in a dialect of English that one might call “legal 
English.”31  Background rules of interpretation that would encourage one to look for metaphor, 
irony, or sarcasm in the constitutional text are very unlikely to help discern that text’s actual 
communicative meaning (though such background rules  might be well suited to discerning the 
meaning of certain poems, diaries, or scripts for Monty Python sketches). 
The universe of documents known as legal documents, of course, comes in all different shapes 
and forms, from contracts to wills to health care proxies. Granting that these are all materially 
different in some respect from poems, diaries, or Monty Python scripts: Where within this universe 
of legal documents does the Constitution best fit? 
I have co-written a book on exactly that question,32 which argues that the best answer is that 
the Constitution looks most like a power of attorney, with a corporate charter coming in a close 
second (and a trust instrument running a distant third).  My co-author and I are planning a revised 
second edition which will focus less on the distinctions among those options than on their 
similarities.  As it happens, that debate matters less to the subdelegation puzzle than it does to 
                                                            
30   For more on this crucial point about the relationship between background interpretative rules and documentary 
type, see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY 
CONSTITUTION 8-11 (2017). 
 
31   See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1321 (2018). 
 
32   See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 30. 
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some other questions of constitutional meaning, because all of the plausible characterizations of 
the Constitution – including the plausible characterization of “sui generis” – locate it somewhere 
within a family of instruments that one can broadly call “fiduciary” instruments.33 
The Constitution’s grants of power to Congress in Article I (and in Articles IV and V as well) 
are, in form, the written record of a delegation of authority from a principal, “We the People,” to 
an agent, “a Congress of the United States.”  It is a delegation of a kind that would be familiar to 
any eighteenth-century observer who had encountered instruments such as powers of attorney – 
and which was certainly familiar to the Committee of Detail consisting of four attorneys and a 
businessman, all of whom no doubt had a classical education that emphasized a fiduciary account 
of government.34  Just as one could delegate to a private agent management authority over a portion 
of one’s affairs, such as the running of a farm or the sale of goods abroad, the Constitution 
represents a delegation to a public agent (or series of agents) of some authority over a portion of 
We the People’s affairs.  And eighteenth-century fiduciary delegations, in any context, carried a 
                                                            
33   In a forthcoming article, Professors Sam Bray and Paul Miller argue, with considerable force, that there was no 
general category of “fiduciary” instruments known to lawyers in the late eighteenth century.  See Samuel L. Bray & 
Paul B. Miller, Against Fiduciary Constitutionalism, 106 VA. L. REV. – (2020) (forthcoming). They claim instead that 
there was a variety of power-conferring instruments in specific settings, and it was not until considerably after the 
ratification of the Constitution that those disparate documents were categorized and synthesized with the label 
“fiduciary.”  That is all true; no one in 1788 would think to write a treatise on something called “fiduciary law.”  
Indeed, some legal dictionaries of that time did not even contain entries for the term “agent.” Nonetheless, the 
categorization of the Constitution as a fiduciary instrument is descriptively accurate.  The reason why later writers 
were able to synthesize these disparate documents into a modern category of “fiduciary instruments” is because there 
was something there to synthesize.  There were certain characteristic features of those documents immanent in the 
structure of the law, even if there was no established terminology for expressing those features in the form of a general 
theory.  There was no vocabulary of fiduciary law in the eighteenth century, but there was a substance of fiduciary 
law in the eighteenth century.  Rob Natelson has exhaustively catalogued the core features of eighteenth-century 
fiduciary (though they did not call it that at the time) law.  See Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, in Gary Lawson, Geoffrey P. Miller, Robert G. Natelson & Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause 57-59 (2010); Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The 
General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 239 (2007).  Even without 
the modern vocabulary, a reasonable eighteenth-century observer could and would see elements in the Constitution 
that resemble the elements in a power of attorney, a corporate charter, and so forth. 
 
34   See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 30, at 31-37; CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, 
ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1994). 
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principle against subdelegation – the more appropriate term than nondelegation, given the initial 
delegation of authority to Congress -- in their wake. 
Authorities for this proposition about a presumptive lack of authority for agency subdelegation 
are numerous – and, as far as I can tell, unanimous.  Matthew Bacon’s enormously influential A 
New Abridgement of the Law,35 first published in 1730, explained: “One who has an Authority to 
do an Act for another, must execute it himself, and cannot transfer it to another; for this being a 
Trust and Confidence reposed in the Party, cannot be assigned to a Stranger whose Ability and 
Integrity were not so well thought of by him for whom the Act was done; therefore an (a) Executory 
having Authority to sell, cannot sell by Attorney.”36  Note that this maxim is not confined to any 
specific kind of instrument; it describes a rule applicable to all instances of what today we would 
call fiduciary authority.  Six further editions of the treatise, extending into the middle of the 
nineteenth century, repeated the maxim, with examples drawn from contexts as varied as powers 
of appointment and guardianships.37 
Early nineteenth-century treatises on agency law said the same thing.  Samuel Livermore, a 
noted agency-law theorist,38 wrote in 1818: “An authority given to one person cannot in general 
be delegated by him to another; for being a personal trust and confidence it is not in its nature 
transmissible, and if there be such a power to one person, to exercise his judgment and discretion, 
                                                            
35   On the underappreciated significance of Bacon’s Abridgement, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 30, at 113. 
 
36   1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 203 (1730).  “Attorney” in this context does not mean a 
lawyer.  It simply means someone who is authorized to act on behalf of another – essentially what today we would 
call an “agent.”  See GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1750) (defining attorneys as “those Persons who 
take upon them the Business of other Men, by whom they are retained”). 
 
37   See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 30, at 113-14. 
 
38   Noted enough to be cited by the United States Supreme Court in the twenty-first century, see Domino’s Pizza, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 475 (2006), and cited by the Court at least eight times in the nineteenth century. 
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he cannot say, that the trust and confidence reposed in him shall be exercised at the discretion of 
another person.”39  Livermore’s treatise offers examples from case law involving attempts at 
subdelegation in contexts ranging from powers of appointment in wills, in which the holder of the 
power tries to designate another person to exercise it,40  to the lack of privity between merchants 
and subdelegees in the absence of express authority on the part of the agents to subdelegate 
power,41 to the lack of authority of factors and supercargoes to entrust sale of goods to subagents 
without the express consent of their principals.42  Joseph Story’s even more famous treatise on 
agency law similarly explained: “one, who has a bare power or authority from another to do an 
act, must execute it himself, and cannot delegate his authority to another; for this being a trust or 
confidence reposed in him personally, it cannot be assigned to a stranger, whose ability and 
integrity might not be known to the principal or who, if known, might not be selected by him for 
such a purpose.”43  Story cites, as examples, many of the same cases that appear in Livermore’s 
treatise.  James Kent piled on: “An agent, ordinarily, and without express authority, has not power 
to employ a sub-agent to do the business, without the knowledge or consent of his principal.  The 
maxim is, that delegatus non potest delegare, and the agency is generally a personal trust and 
confidence which cannot be delegated . . . .”44  I am not aware of any eighteenth- or nineteenth-
                                                            
39   1 SAMUEL LIVERMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT AND OF SALES BY AUCTION 54 (1818). 
 
40   See Ingram v. Ingram, 26 Eng. Rep. 455 (1740). 
 
41   See Cockran v. Irlam, 105 Eng. Rep. 393 (1814). 
 
42   See Catlin v. Bell, 171 Eng. Rep. 59 (1815). 
 
43   JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY, AS A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME 
JURISPRUDENCE § 13, at 14 (1844). 
 
44   2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 496 (1827).  It is possible that Kent and others misunderstood 
the Latin maxim that they invoked.  See Patrick W. Duff & Horace E. Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest 
Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L. REV. 168 (1929); Sean P. Sullivan, Power, but 
How Much Power? Game Theory and the Nondelegation Principle, 104 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1248 (2018) (relying on 
the Duff/Whiteside account).  That question is important as a matter of legal history but unimportant for interpretative 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3607159
16 
 
century source that contradicts these authors on the basic agency law of subdelegation.  “The 
founding-era rule against subdelegation of delegated agency authority is as clearly established as 
any proposition of law can be established.”45  Founding-era private-law lawyers understood very 
well the problem of subdelegation of authority. 
Once the Constitution is seen in agency-law terms, the rule against subdelegation follows as 
a matter of course, as it would for any document in the family of fiduciary instruments.  The 
Constitution’s text and structure confirms and reinforces this fundamental fiduciary principle.  
Text- and structure-based arguments against subdelegation -- such as the ones that I made for 
twenty years before meeting Rob Natelson and that Justice Gorsuch was making in Gundy -- are 
not wrong.  Far from it.  They are simply incomplete.  The same is true of arguments from the 
dictates of representative government.  The substantive content of the subdelegation principle, 
which every textual and structural feature of the Constitution confirms and reconfirms, comes from 
the nature of the Constitution as a particular kind of legal instrument, for which a rule against 
subdelegation is the background presumption.46  The Constitution contains a principle against 
subdelegation because it is the kind of document that contains a principle against subdelegation.  
That is why Chief Justice Marshall could say with such assurance that “[i]t will not be contended 
that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunal, powers which are strictly and 
exclusively legislative.”47  To anyone who sees the Constitution as a kind of fiduciary instrument, 
the conclusion is obvious. 
                                                            
theory.  What matters for understanding founding-era agency law is what reasonable founding-era legal actors would 
have believed about the referents of fiduciary concepts, not whether they would have been historically right to believe 
it. 
 
45   LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 30, at 114. 
 
46   This is an interpretative claim, not a normative claim.   It is a claim about the meaning of a document, not about 
the right or wrong way to run a society. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3607159
17 
 
But identifying a basic principle against subdelegation of legislative authority is only the 
beginning.  Just as well established in the founding era as the principle against agency 
subdelegation  were the exceptions to this general rule.  The rule against subdelegation of agency 
authority was a presumptive rule, not an absolute one.  There were three key principles that carved 
out a space for permissible subdelegation by agents. 
First, parties could expressly authorize any kind or degree of subdelegation that they wished 
in the agency instruments themselves: “an authority may be delegated to another, where the 
attorney has an express authority for that purpose.”48  The crucial term is “express.”  Given the 
strong background interpretative rule against subdelegation, “when it is intended, that an agent 
shall have a power to delegate his authority, it should be given to him by express terms of 
substitution.”49  This exception has no application to the United States Constitution.  There is no 
express authorization in the Constitution for congressional subdelegation of delegated legislative 
authority.  The only linguistically plausible source would be the Necessary and Proper Clause, and 
that does not even come close to constituting an express authorization for subdelegation.50  Indeed, 
if anything, the Necessary and Proper Clause affirmatively negates any such inference, though that 
is a tale for another time and a different scholarly life.51 
                                                            
47   Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825). 
 
48   LIVERMORE, supra note 39, at 55.  Again, see supra note 36, an “attorney” in this context is simply an agent and 
not necessarily a lawyer. 
 
49   STORY, supra note 43, at 15-16. 
50   For an example of what an express authorization for subdelegation would look like, see FLOYD R. MECHEM, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 299 (1914). 
 
51   See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 11. 
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Second, the normal background rule against subdelegation might not hold in specific contexts 
where there is a clear custom or tradition of allowing subdelegation, so that a particular instrument 
in such a setting most likely contemplates an arrangement outside the usual expectations of 
fiduciary law.  An 1814 English case (cited by both Livermore and Story), while finding no privity 
of contract between a merchant and a subagent when the agent had no express authorization to 
subdelegate authority, said in dictum that the answer might have been different if there had been a 
“usage of trade such as to authorize one broker to put the goods of his employer into the hands of 
a sub-broker to sell.”52  Other cases also make reference to customs and practices permitting 
subdelegation, such as a custom of subdelegating collection of notes to local banks when the debtor 
is at a distance.53  Again, this will not work to validate subdelegation of congressional legislative 
authority, if only because there could not possibly be a custom or tradition of subdelegation in a 
regime of separated powers such as that created by the Constitution when there was no established 
history of such separation-of-powers regimes from which to induce a custom or tradition. 
The third principle concerns the kinds of tasks that were, and were not, subject to the 
background presumption against subdelegation.  If you hire a factor and/or supercargo to sell your 
goods overseas, is the supercargo expected personally to pilot the boat, swab the decks, and cook 
the fishcakes on the journey?  Must the factor personally deliver any necessary title documents to 
the local recorder?  The agency instrument can, if the parties so choose, specifically address these 
questions – and can give any answer they please, including making the supercargo swab the decks 
– but what if the instrument is silent?  The background rule was that subdelegation was 
presumptively forbidden for those discretionary aspects of the tasks at hand that involve a 
                                                            
52   Cockran v. Irlam, 103 Eng. Rep. 393, 394 (1814). 
 
53   See, e.g., Dorchester & Milton Bank v. New England Bank, 5 Mass. 177, 188 (1848). 
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significant element of judgment but presumptively allowed for ministerial or minor aspects of the 
tasks.  What counted as discretionary or ministerial would vary with the particular circumstances 
of each arrangement.  A collection agent can allow a subdelegee to deliver an eviction notice,54 a 
general shipping agent can let subdelegees sign bills of lading,55 and insurance agents can let clerks 
sign policies.56  The assumption (subject always to clarification or alteration by the terms of the 
instrument) is that the parties intend to allow a measure of subdelegation on less important matters 
in order to facilitate the efficient accomplishment of the chief ends of the instrument.  In the words 
of an early twentieth-century article on agency law (written by a notable treatise writer), “there are 
many cases wherein from the nature of the duty, or the circumstances under which it is to be 
performed, the employment of subagents is imperatively necessary, and the principal’s interests 
will suffer if they are not so employed.  In such cases, the power to employ the necessary subagents 
will be implied.”57 As Joseph Story summarized it, 
But there are cases, in which the authority [to subdelegate] may be implied; as where 
it is indispensable by the laws, in order to accomplish the end; or it is the ordinary custom 
of trade; or it is understood by the parties to be the mode, in which the particular business 
would or might be done . . . .  In short, the true doctrine, which is to be deduced from the 
decisions, is, (and it is entirely coincident with the dictates of natural justice,) that the 
                                                            
54   See, e.g., McCroskey v. Hamilton, 108 Ga. 640, 34 S.E. 111 (1899). 
 
55   See, e.g., The Guiding Star, 53 F. 936 (S.D. Ohio 1893). 
  
56   See, e.g., Bodine v. Exchange Fire Ins. Co., 51 N.Y. 117 (1872). 
 
57   Floyd R. Mechem, Delegation of Authority by an Agent, 5 MICH. L. REV. 94, 99 (1906).  In some circumstances, 
the end can only be accomplished through subdelegation, as where the agent is not a licensed attorney or auctioneer 
but such a person is necessary to complete the transaction.  In those circumstances, the assumption is that 
subdelegation to the appropriate professionals was contemplated by the parties.  See, e.g. Strong v. West, 110 Ga. 382, 
35 S.E. 693 (1900). 
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authority is exclusively personal, unless, from the express language used, or from the fair 
presumptions, growing out of the particular transaction, or of the usage of trade, a broader 
power was intended to be conferred on the agent.58 
If any of this sounds vaguely familiar, it is because one good way to express the principle 
expounded by Story is to say that power to subdelegate (absent express authorization or custom to 
the contrary) is strictly forbidden with respect to important matters but will be inferred (again 
absent express provision or custom to the contrary) with respect to matters of less interest.  Chief 
Justice Marshall, in Wayman v. Southard, was faithfully translating the private law of agency into 
the Constitution – just as he had done six years earlier in McCulloch v. Maryland when he 
construed the Necessary and Proper Clause as a standard agency-law incidental powers clause 
familiar from numerous private-law contexts.59  As a matter of original meaning, that was exactly 
the right move, to the extent that the Constitution’s character as a fiduciary instrument draws into 
play the basic rules for interpreting fiduciary instruments. 
So, how would a Marshallian determine what counts as a matter of “less interest”?  Private 
law will not always provide a definitive answer, if only because the inquiry of what is more and 
less important depends heavily on context.  The ultimate inquiry is to figure out what is either so 
incidental or so absolutely essential to a decision that one must reasonably presume that the 
principal intends for the agent to subdelegate at least some of the authority.  Notice that the 
inference of authority to subdelegate occurs at both tails of the distribution: Intent to authorize 
                                                            
58   STORY, supra note 43, at 16-17. 
 
59   For the full story on McCulloch and agency law, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 30, at 87-90; Gary Lawson 
& David B. Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 
121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267, 277-79 (2011).  For the seminal study of the agency-law character of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, see Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE 
WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 243 (2004). 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3607159
21 
 
some measure of subdelegation is inferred when the task at hand seems to require it as well as 
when the task is so routine that it cannot possibly matter who performs it.  The agent must 
personally perform those tasks that fall within the middle of the curve.  The shape of the curve will 
vary with the context; what is permissible in one setting may well be flatly forbidden in another. 
While crisp, Scalia-like rules are therefore not likely to emerge from the common law of 
agency, some examples from the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century cases may be 
instructive.  Start with some easy cases that illustrate clear instances of permissible and 
impermissible subdelegation and then move towards the middle of the curve. 
For an example of readily permissible subdelegation, one can look to Goswill v. Dunkley,60 
decided sometime before 1748.61  Plaintiff gave the defendant custody of a watch and a sword to 
take to Porto Bello (which I believe is in Panama) to sell, thus making the defendant the selling 
agent for the plaintiff.  The defendant agent claimed that in order to safekeep the sword and watch, 
“he put them into the warehouse of the South-Sea Company.”62   There was a break-in at the 
warehouse, the goods were stolen, and the plaintiff  sued the defendant.  Plaintiff argued that “these 
goods were delivered to the defendant under a special and particular trust; and that he could not 
defend himself against the plaintiff’s demand, by shewing that he had lodged them in a warehouse, 
which was a committing them to the care of a third person . . . .”63  The court disagreed and ruled 
for the defendant.  That has to be right.  It seems obvious that the parties did not contemplate that 
the sword and watch would never leave the agent’s direct physical custody until the instant of sale 
                                                            
60   93 Eng. Rep. 779. 
 
61   The case report is undated, but the reporter volume covers a time period that ends in 1748. 
 
62   Id. 
 
63   Id. at 779-80. 
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(though one can imagine contracts, and perhaps contexts such as a valuable ring, that so require).  
Defendant surely could not subdelegate the task of finding an appropriate buyer, negotiating the 
price, and so forth, but storing the goods in a warehouse seems no different from piloting the ship 
to Panama.  Defendant would be responsible for exercising due care in the selection of a 
subdelegee,64 but this seems clearly to be the kind of function that all parties could reasonably 
expect to be handled by other agents.  In Chief Justice Marshall’s terms, in an agency arrangement 
for the sale of goods overseas, the actual physical storage of the goods is a matter of “less interest” 
– though the selection of the appropriate place of storage may well be an “important subject” that 
the agent must personally perform. 
For an example of clearly forbidden subdelegation, look no further than the 1740 decision in 
Ingram v. Ingram.65  Mr. Ingram had been given “a power of disposing of a reversionary interest 
in copyhold land . . . in such shares and proportions as he should think fit among the issue of the 
marriage, and for want of such appointment by the husband, to his right heirs . . . .”66  He could 
execute the power by deed or by will.  In his will, Mr. Ingram, “reciting the power under the articles 
and settlement, delegates it to his wife, that she may, in such shares and proportions as she shall 
think proper, dispose of it between his son and daughter . . . .”67  The court invalidated the 
purported subdelegation: “This must be considered as a power of attorney which could be executed 
                                                            
64   The court noted: “if the warehouse was not a place of safe custody, that should have been replied . . . .”  Id. at 780.  
I explore the difficult issues surrounding selection of appropriate subdelegees in another article.  See Gary Lawson, 
The Fiduciary Social Contract, -- SOCIAL PHIL. & POL’Y – (forthcoming 2021). 
 
65   26 Eng. Rep. 455 (1740). 
 
66   Id. 
 
67   Id. 
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only by the husband, to whom it is solely confined, and is not in its nature transmissible or 
delegatory to a third person . . . .”68 
These are polar cases, to be sure, but they have analogues in the Constitution.  Consider the 
grant to Congress of the power “[t]o coin Money, [and] regulate the Value thereof.”69  Does the 
first part of the grant mean that members of Congress must personally work in the mint stamping 
coins?70  Obviously not.  The “important subject” in that grant of power is the authorization to 
produce coins, the specification of the metals to be employed, the denominations to be issued, and 
so forth.  The actual coining or minting is, in this context, a ministerial task, or at least a matter of 
“less interest,” and Congress would be within its authority to subdelegate to executive agents the 
power to “fill up the details” of the actual minting process.  On the other hand, a subdelegation to 
executive agents of the power to fix the value of the coins goes to the heart of what the provision 
is all about – namely, to “regulate the Value thereof.”  Subdelegating that primary authority to 
executive agents would be like subdelegating the authority to distribute the reversion in Ingram v. 
Ingram.  There are easy cases to be found in the Constitution as well as in the common law of 
agency.  For some problems, one needs only, as Justice Story put it, “the dictates of natural justice,” 
sprinkled with a modicum of common sense and some attention to the terms and purposes of the 
agency arrangement. 
Now consider some cases that are not necessarily so easy.  Two early nineteenth-century cases 
are especially instructive. 
                                                            
68   Id. 
 
69   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
 
70   This example actually came up in the 1791 postal debates in Congress.  See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 230-31 (1791) 
(statement of Rep. Sedgwick). 
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In Catlin v. Bell,71 the plaintiff entrusted with the defendant shipper some hats to be sold in 
the West Indies.  “It was then stated, that the defendant not being able to sell the goods in the island 
to which they were destined, had sent them to the Caraccas, in search of a market, where they had 
been destroyed by an earthquake.”72  If the earthquake had happened in the assigned port of 
destination while the hats were in the control of the shipper, presumably the shipper would not 
have been liable for that act of God (unless the contract made the agent strictly liable, which seems 
unlikely).  It was held, however, “that there being a special confidence reposed in the defendant 
with respect to the sale of the goods, he had no right to hand them over to another person, and to 
give them a new destination.”73  Thus, even though the agent may have thought – and sincerely 
thought – that he was serving the best interests of the principal by trying to get the best price, that 
alone would not justify entrusting the items to someone else to perform the central task of selling 
the goods.  Here, the “important subjects” were both the shipping and sale of the goods, and neither 
of those elements could be subdelegated without express permission or custom to support it.  A 
matter of “less interest” would surely be the storage of the goods pending sale; had the defendant 
responsibly chosen a warehouse in the West Indies and the goods been stolen from that warehouse, 
the defendant presumably would not have been liable absent a showing of negligence in the choice 
of warehouseman. 
Now consider Bromley v. Coxwell.74  Bromley sent Coxwell to India to sell “one hundred 
engravings from his plate of His Majesty on horseback,”75 hoping to get at least a guinea for each.  
                                                            
71   171 Eng. Rep. 59 (1815). 
 
72   Id. 
 
73   Id. 
 
74   126 Eng. Rep. 1372 (1801). 
 
75   Id. 
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Bromley significantly overestimated his artistic talent, His Majesty’s overseas popularity, or both, 
because Coxwell in Calcutta was able to sell only one print for just three shillings and five pence 
(about one-sixth of a guinea, if I calculate correctly).76  Coxwell then tried selling them in Madras 
“but with no better success.”77  At that point, Coxwell “left the residue in the hands of an agent at 
Madras to be disposed of by him . . . .”78  Upon Coxwell’s return to England, Bromley sued him 
for conversion.   Bromley won at trial but lost on appeal.  To some extent, the case turned on the 
appropriateness of conversion as a remedy, but all three appellate judges at least doubted whether 
there was any liability.  The authorizing language in the agency instrument was as follows: 
“William Bromley agrees to send out by James Coxwell one hundred 
engravings from his plate of His Majesty on horseback under these conditions, that 
provided James Coxwell can dispose of any one or all of them at above one guinea 
each, he the said James Coxwell is to be accountable to William Bromley on his 
return to England, for as many as he may dispose of at one guinea each; and William 
Bromley agrees to take all or as many as may be returned by the said James 
Coxwell, provided he the said James Coxwell cannot sell them in India or at any 
other port he may touch at, without expecting any sum from James Coxwell, or 
making any charge; and William Bromley further agrees to and authorizes to sell 
them for whatever they may fetch, if not more than one guinea may be offered for 
them separately.”79 
                                                            
 
76   Coxwell was fully authorized to take the lower price.  See id. (“ ‘William Bromley further agrees to and authorizes 
to sell them for whatever they may fetch, if not more than one guinea may be offered for them separately’ ”). 
 
77   Id. 
 
78   Id. 
 
79   Id. 
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Judge Heath remarked that “I do not see why he [Coxwell] was not at liberty to leave them with 
an agent to be sold”; Judge Rooke thought it was fine that “[t]he Defendant left them in India 
judging for the best”; and Judge Chambre said that “[t]he agreement does not express the 
Defendant shall sell the goods himself; it seems therefore that the delivery to his agent was within 
the terms of the agreement.”80  There is obviously much that we do not know about the context of 
the arrangement from the very brief case report.  Was Coxwell known to be a a factor?  Was 
Coxwell just a traveler taking the prints to India?  Did Coxwell run an import-export business with 
multiple locations, so that the use of subagents would be taken for granted?  We do not know (or 
at least I do not know).  All we know for sure is that the court was willing to infer a power to 
subdelegate the sale of the prints from the absence of any specification that the task was to be 
performed by Coxwell.  There was obviously something in this arrangement that muted to some 
extent the baseline rule against subdelegation.  The “important subject” was apparently getting the 
goods to India for sale; how and where they were sold was evidently a matter of “less interest.”  
The language of the instrument, to be sure, does perhaps lend itself to this construction: the essence 
of the agreement is “Get these prints to India and see if you can sell them – for anything at all – 
however and wherever you can manage to do it.”  In that context, subdelegation to effectuate the 
sales seems a natural consequence of the arrangement. 
Do these cases yield a crisp line that can always be drawn between what is important and 
what is of less interest?  Of course not.  Relatively few constitutional doctrines have lines so crisp 
and clear that some element of judgment is never necessary.  The point is only that courts have 
been exercising judgment about subdelegation of agency authority for a very long time.  This is 
                                                            
 
80   Id. at 1373. 
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not a novel inquiry or one with no guideposts or analogies upon which to draw.  It is a distinctively 
legal inquiry. 
In light of the cases, here is one tentative thought about the application of these principles 
to one particular Article I power.  A context in which power to subdelegate has often been found 
concerns collection of debts in distant locations – which was obviously a major issue in earlier 
times without instantaneous money transfers and communication, when debt collection, and even 
the negotiation of notes and bills of exchange, had to be done in person.  Authorization of an agent 
to collect a debt or transfer a note would normally carry with it power to designate an appropriate 
subagent in the debtor’s or transferee’s jurisdiction.81  There are circumstances, in short, in which 
a local subagent is likely to have knowledge and access that is not readily available to the prime 
agent.  If that is an expected state of affairs, one might reasonably presume that the parties to the 
agreement would anticipate some measure of subdelegation to local agents to take advantage of 
that specialized local knowledge.  Where the task depends on general skill and knowledge, 
however, rather than localized skill or knowledge, the baseline presumption against subdelegation 
would hold. 
All of this is potentially relevant to the Constitution because some of Congress’s enumerated 
powers require uniform, nationwide application and some of them do not.  In some instances, the 
requirement of uniformity is express: With respect to the taxing power, “all Duties, Imposts and 
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States”;82 Congress has power “[t]o establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the 
                                                            
81   See, e.g., Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Smith, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 763 (1845). 
 
82   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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United States”;83 and Congress can implement the Constitution’s full faith and credit requirement 
by “general Laws.”84  For other powers, a uniformity requirement seems implicit: Could there 
really be a different value for federal coin in one State rather than another, or different federal 
patent laws for Texas and Wisconsin?  Other powers, however, do not seem to require the same 
degree of uniformity.  The power to “establish Post Offices and post Roads”85 surely does not 
force Congress to have the same number, or even proportion, of post roads and post offices in each 
State.  More fundamentally, the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States”86 
does not contain an express uniformity requirement, and it is not obvious that it contains an implicit 
one.  Indeed, the Constitution by implication denies any such general uniformity requirement by 
singling out one kind of commercial regulation – port regulations – for uniformity: “No Preference 
shall be given to any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of 
another.”87  Thus, it is possible that regulation of commerce is a field in which local knowledge 
and variation might be invaluable; the regulations appropriate to New York may not be appropriate 
for Wyoming.  Does that provide a ground for applying the subdelegation doctrine less rigidly 
with regulation of commerce than with some other congressional powers?  More specifically, 
could different air pollution rules be appropriate in New York than in Wyoming, with those 
different rules ascertained by subagents with local knowledge?  Without answering these 
questions, I will just say that if one is looking for limiting principles to shield key elements of the 
                                                            
83   Id.  art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 
84   Id. art. IV, § 1. 
 
85   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
 
86   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 
87   Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. 
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modern regulatory state from a reinvigorated subdelegation doctrine, this is a possible avenue to 
explore. 
This body of private-law agency doctrine gives content to Chief Justice Marshall’s distinction 
between the “important subjects” that the legislature must decide and those matters of “less 
interest” that can be subdelegated to others.  In an agency instrument, the principal described with 
particularity what the agent was authorized to do.  The agent presumptively had to perform those 
tasks, unless the nature of the instrument, the task, or both counseled otherwise.  Unless it was a 
general power of attorney, agents did not have unlimited authority to act – and agents certainly did 
not have unlimited authority to allow others to act on behalf of the principal.  The nature of the 
initial delegation limits, in legally defined ways, the nature of permissible subdelegations. 
In the context of the Constitution, this cuts in two directions.  On the one hand, it is probably 
not the case that all substantive executive rulemaking is per se a forbidden subdelegation; it will 
depend very much on the context.  On the other hand, congressional grants of discretionary 
authority, whether rulemaking or adjudicatory, to other actors cannot be unlimited or so ill-defined 
in scope that no one—including the agency, the courts or Congress—could determine where they 
began or ended.  Nor can those grants of authority go beyond what a sensible understanding of the 
tasks conferred on Congress permits.  Reasonable people could perhaps disagree about hard cases, 
as reasonable judges and lawyers have been able to disagree about hard cases in the private-law 
context for centuries.  But these are disagreements about law, not about policy or theories of 
government. 
There was plenty of law on subdelegation in 1788 and 1825.  One just needs to know where 
to look for it. 
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II 
 
In Gundy, Justice Gorsuch proposed three alternative principles as an account of the 
constitutional non-subdelegation rule.  It is accordingly useful to see how Justice Gorsuch’s 
principles compare, as a matter of both law and judicial manageability, to the agency-law doctrine 
of Chief Justice Marshall.  As it happens, Justice Gorsuch’s principles loosely map onto the 
common-law categories for ascertaining permissible subdelegations, but the common-law 
categories are both better grounded in original meaning and better suited for judicial application. 
Justice Gorsuch’s third principle – that there is no subdelegation problem when Congress is 
simply helping execute powers already vested in other actors – very loosely corresponds to the 
common-law category of express authorization.  The Necessary and Proper Clause allows 
Congress to make necessary and proper laws “for carrying into Execution,” inter alia, federal 
executive or judicial powers.  If that is all that Congress is doing, it is doing something that the 
Constitution expressly permits it to do.    That is not truly an express authority to subdelegate, 
because the powers being executed already exist in the executive and judicial actors, who do not 
need congressional authorization to do what the Constitution already entitles them to do.88  Thus, 
Justice Gorsuch is not really identifying a permissible domain of subdelegation – and the 
                                                            
88   If the congressional laws purport to limit rather than facilitate the powers vested by the Constitution in the President 
or the courts, they are not laws “for carrying into Execution” those powers and thus are not authorized by the Necessary 
and Proper Clause; one does not “carry[] into Execution” a power by prohibiting or limiting its exercise.  See David 
E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 75, 172-74.  
Indeed, the most important question in these contexts is not whether Congress has subdelegated legislative power by 
granting too much discretion but whether congressional attempts to limit rather than facilitate the discretion of 
executive or judicial actors improperly intrude on those actors’ constitutional prerogatives.  Can Congress fix the form 
of notice for judicial auctions?  Determine the payment terms for winning bidders in such auctions?  Tell courts what 
evidence they can and cannot admit into the record in those proceedings?  Order courts to rule in favor of one particular 
party?  A similar sequence of questions can be framed about congressional attempts to regulate the exercise of 
executive power – and the questions are no easier to resolve in that context.  I have very tentatively explored these 
issues elsewhere, see Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 
18 Const. Commentary 191 (2001), and we can mercifully pass them over here. 
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Constitution does not expressly provide one either.  He is simply describing a context in which 
grants of discretion do not raise issues of subdelegation. 
Justice Gorsuch’s second principle – that Congress can employ executive or judicial agents as 
fact-finders to determine the applicability of laws – has a very rough correspondence to the agency-
law exception for established customs and practices.  The application of law often requires findings 
of fact.  If, for example, a statute prescribes a calendar date for its own effectiveness, someone has 
to determine whether that specific calendar date has or has not arrived and thus whether the law is 
or is not in effect.  If that seems trivial (how hard can it be to read a date off of a calendar?), it is 
precisely the triviality that makes it illustrative.  In applying such laws, do executives or courts 
refer the matter to the legislature to determine whether the specified effective date has arrived?  Of 
course not.  They decide the matter for themselves.  Isn’t that sort of decision exactly what 
executing and/or construing laws is all about?  Whatever custom or tradition of government action 
was incorporated into the Constitution’s separation-of-powers scheme through the basic 
definitions of legislative, executive, and judicial power, surely this much at least qualifies: 
executing and judging includes the ascertainment of the factual conditions for application of a law. 
Of course, once one moves beyond calendars as measures of a law’s effective date, things 
start to get a bit cloudier.  Suppose that the effective date of a law is prescribed in terms of events 
other than planetary motions, so that a law becomes or stays effective, say, upon the eruption of a 
volcano, or some other country continuing to respect American neutrality, or a foreign country not 
imposing reciprocally unequal or unreasonable tariffs on imported American goods.  Someone has 
to determine whether the conditions for the law’s effectiveness have been satisfied.  Who does 
that?  Again, executive and judicial agents customarily and traditionally perform that task.  This is 
the category of so-called contingent legislation which Justice Gorsuch’s second principle was 
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describing, represented by a very large percentage of the pre-New Deal subdelegation cases in the 
Supreme Court.89  The question here is whether the principle, expressed in terms of either fact-
finding or custom, contains limits on the kinds of facts which Congress can charge executive or 
judicial agents with ascertaining.  Calendar dates are at one extreme.  At the other would be a law 
that prescribes its effective date to be “whenever the President [or perhaps the Attorney General] 
decides it should apply.”  Can an executive or judicial actor’s will be the triggering contingency 
for the effectiveness of a statute? And if the answer is no, are there other “facts” that are so open-
ended or policy-laden that committing their determination to executive or judicial agents 
effectively makes those actors legislators?  (Two Justices in 1892 thought that letting the President 
determine whether other countries had imposed “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable” trade 
restrictions on American products “certainly extends to the executive the exercise of those 
discretionary powers which the Constitution has vested in the law-making department.”90)  Justice 
Gorsuch clearly wants to avoid how-much-is-too-much kinds of questions, but the category of 
contingent legislation may not lend itself to categorical judgments.  No formulation of a test can 
eliminate the need for judgment, at some point in the process, about whether ascertainment of a 
contingent “fact” amounts to making the law.  That is an issue under current doctrine, it would be 
an issue under Chief Justice Marshall’s test, and it would be an issue under Justice Gorsuch’s three 
principles.91 
                                                            
89   See, e.g., Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813); Marshall Field & Co. v. 
Clark,143 U.S. 649 (1892); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).  For a discussion of these 
cases, see Lawson, supra note 11, at 361-69. 
 
90   143 U.S. at 699-700 (Lamar, J., dissenting). 
 
91   Part of the reason why the contingent legislation – or “executive or judicial fact-finding” -- cases are so difficult 
is that the distinction between law and fact on which they are based is itself a conventional rather than metaphysical 
distinction.  But pursuing that angle leads inexorably to a book-length discussion.  See GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF 
THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS (2017). 
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The real action concerns Justice Gorsuch’s first principle, which allows Congress to let 
executive or judicial agents “fill up the details.”  The quoted phrase comes from the end of a 
sentence in Wayman v. Southard: “The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those 
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less 
interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under 
such general provisions to fill up the details.”92  Notice how Justice Gorsuch transforms the 
meaning of “fill up the details.”  In Wayman, the term applies only to, and indeed simply 
alternatively describes, matters of less interest.  It is fine, says Chief Justice Marshall, to let agents 
“fill up the details” on those less important matters.  But that does not mean that it is okay for 
Congress to let agents “fill up the details” on “important subjects.”  To the contrary, those 
“important subjects . . . must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself.”  The key distinction 
for Chief Justice Marshall is thus not big pictures versus details.  It is important subjects versus 
matters of less interest.  Justice Gorsuch, however, omits the context when he explains that 
Congress can “accomplish all it might wish to achieve. It may always authorize executive branch 
officials to fill in even a large number of details . . . .”93  Chief Justice Marshall would disagree, 
and Chief Justice Marshall would be right.  Congress can only authorize executive officials to fill 
in details, in either a large or small number, with respect to matters of “less interest.”  That surely 
does not cover everything that Congress “might wish to achieve.” 
Thus, the key rhetorical –and substantive – move for Justice Gorsuch is to give free-standing 
effect to a congressional ability to charge executive and judicial agents with filling up details.  An 
agency-law based approach to subdelegation could potentially be considerably stricter, because 
                                                            
92   23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. 
 
93   139 S.Ct. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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the detail-filling capacity of sub-agents is not free-standing but is limited only to subjects that by 
their nature as matters of “less interest” can permissibly be charged to the discretion of subagents.  
Put another way, for Chief Justice Marshall and the agency-law view that he represents, “fill up 
the details” is somewhat of a throwaway embellishment on the true inquiry, which looks to the 
nature of the tasks in the context of the obvious purposes of the instrument in question.  For Justice 
Gorsuch, “fill up the details” is the inquiry itself.  That is not what the Constitution prescribes. 
 
III 
 
Justice Gorsuch was at pains to say that “[t]he separation of powers does not prohibit any 
particular policy outcome, let alone dictate any conclusion about the proper size and scope of 
government.”94  In other words, says Justice Gorsuch, questions about the form of congressional 
statutes – the extent to which they grant discretion to other actors – is independent of questions 
about the content of congressional statutes – the extent of their regulatory reach.  That is true up 
to a point – but only up to a point. 
Go back to Justice Story’s summary of the agency law of subdelegation.  Justice Story said 
that authority to subdelegate will be implied “where it is indispensable by the laws, in order to 
accomplish the end.”  The classic illustration would be a grant of authority to a non-lawyer agent 
to execute a transaction in which a lawyer’s participation at some point is essential.  The natural 
assumption is that the non-lawyer agent is authorized to hire a lawyer to perform that part of the 
task; otherwise, the initial delegation to the agent would be pointless.  Or suppose that an agent is 
tasked with selling an item at auction, but the agent is not a licensed auctioneer.  Must the agent 
                                                            
94   Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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get an auctioneer’s license, or is the obvious assumption that the agent will engage a licensed 
auctioneer and be responsible only for making an appropriate selection of a subagent?  One might 
extend this reasoning a bit further to conclude that where subdelegation is practically as well as 
legally necessary to successful accomplishment of a task, we can presume that the principal 
intended to authorize the agent to subdelegate to the extent necessary to accomplish the prescribed 
ends. 
Precisely such an argument, conducted in precisely those agency-law terms, emerged in the 
Second Congress in 1791 in connection with post roads.  One big debate was whether Congress 
had to specify the path of the postal routes or whether it could leave that matter to executive 
discretion.95  Several representatives, including James Madison, vigorously argued that Congress 
constitutionally had to fix the routes.96  Madison’s comments are especially pertinent, as they 
concern the extent to which necessity, in either a strict or loose sense of the term, can bear on the 
propriety of subdelegation: 
However difficult it may be to determine with precision the exact boundaries of the 
Legislative and Executive powers, he was of opinion that those arguments . . . [in favor 
of subdelegation to the President] were not well founded, for they admit of such 
construction as will lead to blending those powers to as to leave no line of separation 
whatsoever.  The greatest obstacle to the due exercise of the powers vested in the 
                                                            
95   For a detailed account of that debate, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 30, at 118-23. 
 
96   See, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791) (describing statement of Rep. Livermore) (“it is as clearly their 
[Congress’s] duty to designate the roads as to establish the offices; and he did not think they could with propriety 
delegate that power, which they were themselves appointed to exercise”); id. at 231 (statement of Rep. Hartley) (“We 
represent the people, we are constitutionally vested with the power of determining upon the establishment of post 
roads; and, as I understand at present, ought not to delegate the power to any other person”); id. at 235 (statement of 
Rep. Vining) (“The Constitution has certainly given us the power of establishing post and roads, and it is not even 
implied that it should be transferred to the President”). 
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Legislature by the bill, which has been mentioned, is the difficulty of accommodating the 
regulations to the various interests of the different parts of the Union: and this is said to 
be almost impracticable.  But it may be remembered, that similar embarrassments 
appeared when the impost and tonnage bills were under consideration; on those subjects, 
the members were obliged to be governed, in a great degree, by mutual information and 
reciprocal confidence.  In respect to the establishment and arrangements of the different 
ports of entry and clearance, and other objects, that was a business of much greater 
importance and difficulty than this; but it was accomplished.97 
On the other hand, many representatives had no constitutional problem with letting the executive 
determine the postal routes.98  One recurring argument in favor of letting the President decide on 
the postal routes was precedent.  Congress had previously imposed an excise tax on spirits, and to 
facilitate collection of the tax the country was divided by statute into fourteen districts, with each 
district consisting of a State “but subject to alterations by the President of the United States, from 
time to time, by adding to the smaller such portions of the greater as shall in his judgment best 
tend to secure and facilitate the collection of the revenue; which districts it shall be lawful for the 
President of the United States to subdivide into surveys of inspection, and the same to alter at his 
discretion.”99  Representatives Bourne and Sedgwick both invoked this statute as precedent for the 
necessity of letting the President determine the paths of the post roads.100  Madison’s response is 
                                                            
97   Id. at 238 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
 
98   See, e.g., id. at 230-31 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick). 
 
99   Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. XV, § 4, 1 Stat. 199, 200. 
 
100   See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 232 (statement of Rep. Bourne) (“In passing the excise law, the House, not thinking 
themselves possessed of sufficient information, empowered the President to mark out the districts and surveys; and if 
they had a right to delegate such power to the Executive, the further delegation of the power of marking out the roads 
for the conveyance of the mail, could hardly be thought dangerous”); id. at 239 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick) 
(“Nothing more was in that instance done, than to define the powers and duties annexed to the offices, but the limits 
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instructive: “The reference to the appointments and arrangements made by the Executive, pursuant 
to the powers delegated to the Executive by the excise law, cannot be considered as a parallel case; 
no similar exigency exists to justify a similar delegation . . . . Where is the necessity of departing 
from the principles of the Constitution in respect to the post office and post roads, more than in all 
other cases?”101  Madison thus questioned the factual predicate of the argument for necessity, but 
he conceded that necessity might justify subdelegation in principle (and he thought the principle 
satisfied in the case of the excise districts). 
Put aside (1) whether Madison was right to concede the “necessity” of letting the President 
fix the excise collection districts and (2) whether fixing the districts was even an “important 
subject[]” for which serious subdelegation analysis was necessary or was instead a matter of “less 
interest.”  (The location of post roads was clearly among the “important subjects” in 1791; being 
on a post road was a huge economic boon, equivalent to a federal pork-barrel water project.)  Focus 
just for the moment on the general principle that necessity, of some degree, might justify 
subdelegation, presumably on the theory that if it is strictly necessary to accomplish the stated 
tasks, the principal must have intended to allow sufficient subdelegation to allow effective 
completion of the tasks.  If that is right – and Joseph Story certainly thought it was right – then one 
must ask one very large question in the context of the federal Constitution: What are the tasks with 
which We the People charged its agent Congress?  One cannot judge whether subdelegation is 
necessary to accomplish a task without knowing what task is to be accomplished. 
                                                            
to which their authority was to extend, and their number, was very properly left with the Executive.  In that instance, 
such a delegation was indispensably necessary; nor was it, in his opinion, less necessary in the multifarious 
arrangements of post offices”). 
 
101   Id.  at 238 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
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Consider in this regard the Supreme Court’s (spectacularly unsuccessful) attempt to rid the 
world of subdelegation challenges in Mistretta v. United States,102 in which the Court made it very 
clear that claims that Congress had granted too much discretion to executive agents would not be 
well received.103  The Court’s rationale for the post-New Deal case law was refreshingly direct: 
“our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex 
society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its 
job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”104  It is easy to roll one’s 
eyes at this transparently political and sorry excuse for constitutional reasoning, but consider the 
awful possibility that the Court just might be at least partially right as a matter of original meaning. 
What is Congress’s “job,” according to the Court in Mistretta?  The Court does not exactly 
say, though we know that whatever the Court thinks is Congress’s “job” cannot be accomplished 
without the kind of subdelegation that pervades the modern administrative state.  That is all we 
need to fill in the gap:  The Court in Mistretta is assuming that Congress’s “job” is to create, 
maintain, sustain, and empower the modern administrative state.  If that is indeed Congress’s 
constitutional “job,” there is at least a credible argument that, as a practical matter, Congress 
“needs” to subdelegate authority to implement a regulatory structure of that magnitude.  Yes, there 
are available to Congress procedural devices, such as fast-track approvals of legislation codifying 
agency action, that can increase its capacity to legislate, and those could go some distance towards 
reconciling a large role for the federal government with a strict rule against subdelegation.  But 
                                                            
102   488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 
103   Lawyers and lower courts did not get the message, either in Mistretta or in the numerous other unanimous or near-
unanimous rejections of subdelegation challenges between 1989 and 2019.  See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 156-65 (8th ed. 2019). 
 
104   488 U.S. at 372. 
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expecting Congress to vote on everything that shows up in the Code of Federal Regulations and 
(it is easy to overlook this aspect of the administrative state) on every significant matter of policy 
that shows up in an agency adjudication is simply not feasible.  If Congress’s “job” is indeed to 
micro-manage the entirety of American society, there is at least a serious argument that massive 
subdelegation can be justified by even a strict Madisonian understanding of necessity. 
There are serious and intelligent thinkers who believe that this is indeed Congress’s “job.”  
Think about how many people you know in this business who believe in constitutional welfare 
rights, who think that the Preamble means that America must adopt socialism because nothing else 
will “establish Justice,” and so forth.  If that is truly the right substantive account of American 
constitutionalism, then the subdelegation question takes a very different turn. 
Of course, as a matter of the Constitution’s actual communicative meaning rather than its 
conformance to a trendy political agenda, Congress obviously does not have constitutional power, 
much less constitutional responsibility, to run Leviathan.  But this means that limited government 
is in fact a crucial premise in the argument for a subdelegation doctrine.  It is important to that 
argument that Congress’s “job” not involve such a massive overseeing of everybody’s lives, 
fortunes, and sacred honors that subdelegation meets a strict requirement of necessity to effectuate 
those tasks.  If one believes that Congress’s “job” is to legislate in accordance with the limited set 
of tasks that it is given by the enumerations of legislative powers in the Constitution, there is no 
chance that a strict-necessity-based argument for subdelegation passes the laugh test.  But that 
means that Justice Gorsuch is wrong to suggest that the scope of federal power and the 
subdelegation doctrine are unconnected.  Arguments for limited government – or at least against 
unlimited government -- are essential to arguments against subdelegation. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3607159
40 
 
Thus, the interpretatively correct account of subdelegation probably does not provide all of 
the assurances that Justice Gorsuch wants to give to Justices who balance constitutional meaning 
against judicial restraint and end up with the latter more often than not.  Congress does not have 
broad power to allow executive or judicial agents to “fill up the details.”  It can only do that with 
respect to matters of “less interest,” so there is no way to avoid determining what matters are 
“important subjects” and matters are of “less interest” in each statutory scheme.  Nor can one 
categorically state that subdelegation is unrelated to the overall size and scope of federal power.  
If one believes in the subdelegation doctrine, one has to believe, at least to some degree, in 
constitutionally limited government.  In other words, one has to believe, at least to some degree, 
in the Constitution as it is written. 
 
IV 
 
None of this means, of course, that a judge, as opposed to a scholar, must run the subdelegation 
doctrine to its ultimate conclusion.  The law in the world, as opposed to the law in the academy, is 
full of circumstances in which principle gives way to practice.  A major scholar has written a 500-
page book illustrating precisely this point.105 
A perfectly sensible view, for example, would be to say: 
(1) the subdelegation doctrine presupposes some conception of limited government, so it 
does not permit any and all arrangements that Congress would like to enact;  
                                                            
105 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY AND CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION (2019).  For a trenchant critique of Professor Lessig’s normative suggestions, see the book review by 
Amul R. Thapar & Joe Masterman, Fidelity and Construction, 129 YALE L.J. 774 (2020).  The review does not take 
serious issue with Professor Lessig’s descriptive claims. 
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(2)  the proper test for subdelegation is the agency-law test that would have been obvious to 
any private-law lawyer in 1788; but 
(3) as a matter of precedent, laws that have been upheld or upon which significant 
institutional capital has been constructed will be grandfathered in, whether or not they are 
consistent with original meaning; but but  
(4) that is far as things will be allowed to go, so new innovations or laws that are recent 
enough not to have given rise to significant expectation interests are fair game for serious 
judicial investigation and possible invalidation. 
This set of propositions keeps faith with the original meaning of the Constitution by not allowing 
past distortions in practice to distort constitutional meaning, while recognizing the basic fact that 
constitutional meaning is not the only force driving constitutional adjudication. 
To be clear: I am not endorsing this approach as an adjudicative theory.  Adjudicative 
theory is a sub-species of moral and political theory, and I have nothing interesting or useful to 
contribute to the world as a moral or political theorist.  I simply note that for a Justice who 
considers fidelity to original meaning an important part of adjudicative theory but thinks it must 
be bounded by some (relatively modest measure of) extra-constitutional considerations, this is a 
possible approach to take.  Further the deponent saith not.  
A full explication of the implications of this approach would require a book-length 
discussion of adjudicative theory, and that is not on the menu for the moment.  For now, I want to 
make only two points. 
First, focusing on the distinction between interpretation and adjudication requires one to 
keep clear two ideas that one should be keeping clear even without regard to the present problem: 
ascertaining constitutional meaning and engaging in constitutional decision-making.  The former 
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is an empirical, descriptive enterprise that seeks to answer the question: What is the objective 
communicative content of a particular expression or set of expressions?  The second activity is a 
normative enterprise: How should real-world legal actors choose to deploy the instruments of 
governmental violence?  It is possible to say that constitutional decision-making should be based 
solely on constitutional meaning, but it is also possible that say that the latter is relevant to the 
former but not necessarily decisive for it.106  If we assume that there are presently five Justices 
who think that constitutional meaning contributes more than trivially and rhetorically to 
constitutional decision-making, there may be some attraction to the idea that vested expectations 
ought not to be undone, however unconstitutional they may be, but that future expectations need 
to conform to constitutional meaning. 
As a matter of interpretative theory, the key point to emphasize is that precedent is a device 
for guiding normative decision-making.  It is not a device for ascertaining constitutional meaning.  
Past precedents do not “fix” or “liquidate” (to use the in-vogue Madisonian term107) the 
Constitution’s communicative meaning.  They might, however, generate vested expectations, and 
if one treats those expectations as vested rights, then there is an adjudicative basis for leaving those 
vested rights untouched. 
Second, private law, this time the law of property rather than the law of agency, provides 
an apt analogy.  Consider the law of adverse possession. If someone adversely possesses an 
interest, it does not change the communicative meaning of the grant that created the interest.  The 
                                                            
106   Larry Solum has defined the “contribution thesis” as the claim that “the content of constitutional law is constrained 
by the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text.”  Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and 
Originalism, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 923, 954 (2009).  The contribution thesis does not specify to what extent 
communicative meaning constrains decision-making.  This article assumes that at least five Justices consider it at least 
a significant constraint. 
 
107   See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
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grant, as a matter of communicative meaning, still conveyed the property to the previous possessor.  
The law simply chooses to ignore the ordinary legal consequences of the grant.  And the fact of 
adverse possession has no effect, communicative or legal, on the other interests in the grant.  
Adverse possession of the present interest has no effect on the future interests.  Nor would an 
objectively faulty judgment allowing adverse possession of the present interest justify later 
objectively faulty judgments regarding the future interests.  The meaning of the grant is one thing; 
its legal effect is another. 
Justice Scalia recognized the aptness of the comparison. In Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. 
Washington State Dep’t of Revenue,108Justice Scalia argued for limiting the application of the 
dormant commerce clause doctrine to cases of interstate discrimination.  In resisting the Court’s 
expansion of the doctrine in that case, Justice Scalia remarked:  “It is astonishing that we should 
be expanding our beachhead in this impoverished territory [of the dormant commerce clause], 
rather than being satisfied with what we have already acquired by a sort of intellectual adverse 
possession.”109 When courts choose precedent over constitutional meaning, they are allowing a 
past wrong to prevail over the formally valid title (with objective communicative meaning playing 
the role of title), at least partly because of the passage of time and the formation of expectations 
based on mere possession.  Many of the arguments in favor of precedent – stability, reliance, cost-
savings, and so forth – are also arguments that can be made in favor of adverse possession.110  But 
precedent in this sense is a tool for decision-making.  It is not a tool for interpretation of a text.  
                                                            
108   483 U.S. 232 (1987). 
 
109   Id. at 265 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
110   For a compendium of arguments in favor of adverse possession, see Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for 
Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419 (2001).  To be clear: I am not endorsing the arguments for either precedent or 
adverse possession.  I am simply pointing out their similarities. 
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Rather, it is a reason for choosing to ignore the interpretation of a text.  As Christopher Green has 
brilliantly put it: 
Recognizing the distinction between when to interpret and how to interpret 
is the key to seeing why recognizing the power to adhere to a possibly-incorrect 
earlier decision does not entail recognizing a general power to revise the 
Constitution freely. Deciding that it is more important that some issues are more 
importantly settled than settled correctly does not alter the criterion for what 
answers are actually correct. The Constitution still means what it means, and 
interpreters subject to an adverse-possession rule need neither surrender their 
convictions about its meaning through the equivalent of an intellectual lobotomy, 
nor believe that interpreters are free to shift and morph the meaning of the 
Constitution without any constraint. Precisely because it is part of constitutional 
construction, and not constitutional interpretation, an adverse-possession model for 
adherence to incorrectly-decided precedent would merely limit the power of present 
interpreters to give effect to their interpretations; it would not affect their 
interpretations as such.111 
If one recognizes precedent as akin to adverse possession, it will become clear that allowing 
the precedent/possession to prevail over the meaning/title in one instance does not affect the 
validity of surrounding meanings/titles.  The effects of adverse possession are confined to the 
specific possessory interest that has been adversely possessed.  There are good reasons to treat 
precedents the same way, allowing previous interpretative errors to stand when reliance or other 
                                                            
111   Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Theory and the Activismometer: How to Think About Indeterminacy, 
Restraint, Vagueness, Executive Review, and Precedent, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 403 (2014). 
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interests strongly counsel it but not using that mistake as a justification for future mistakes.  Hence: 
“this far but no further.”112 
There is obviously much more that one could say about how to frame an argument along 
these lines.  That is not my wheelhouse; I am neither an adjudicative theorist nor a litigator.  But 
for those who value both constitutional meaning and settled practice, “this far but no further” has 
promise as a limiting principle, if a limiting principle one seeks. 
                                                            
112   For a critique of this idea, see Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1173, 1182-83 (2006): 
 
Unlike the doctrine of adverse possession in property law, which is peripheral to the system of 
property ownership, stare decisis in constitutional law changes the nature of the enterprise. Bedrock 
precedents cannot be quarantined; instead, they inevitably affect the system of constitutional law as 
a whole.  
The originalist impulse regarding these bedrock but allegedly “wrong” precedents is to say 
“this far, but not an inch farther.” Under this view, the court should not overrule key precedents, but 
it should always return to first principles in considering new issues. But this is an untenable stance 
in a legal system that seeks some form of coherence. 
 
If one regards coherence with previous decisions, as opposed to coherence with constitutional meaning, as the 
paramount value, there is something to this argument.  But it is obviously circular.  And it begs important questions 
about what a precedent contains and what would constitute an expansion of it. 
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